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# **Insurrectionary Civic Strikes in Latin America 1931–1961**

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**Patricia Parkman**

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# **INSURRECTIONARY CIVIC STRIKES IN LATIN AMERICA: 1931-1961**

**by Patricia Parkman**

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## **Introduction**

One of the characteristic features of the Latin American political landscape is a phenomenon best described as a civic strike: the collective suspension of normal activities by people of diverse social groups united by a common political objective.<sup>1</sup> Latin Americans themselves have most often used the term "general strike" (*huelga general*, or *grève général* in Haiti) to describe such actions, but this term, obviously borrowed from the labor movement, obscures the distinctive cross-class character of the civic strike. Civic strikes may be acts of protest, such as the shutdown of Managua, Nicaragua following the assassination of newspaper publisher Joaquín Chamorro in 1978, or they may serve as support for military movements against established governments, as in Venezuela in 1958 and Cuba in 1959.<sup>2</sup> This paper considers the use of the civic strike as a nonmilitary insurrection by citizens who had no armed forces at their disposal.

From 1931 to 1961 eleven Latin American presidents left office in the wake of civic strikes: Carlos Ibáñez del Campo of Chile (1931), Gerardo Machado of Cuba (1933), Maximiliano Hernández Martínez of El Salvador (1944), Jorge Ubico of Guatemala (1944), Elie Lescot of Haiti (1946), Arnulfo Arias of Panama (1951), Paul Magloire, Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis, and Frank Sylvain of Haiti (1956 and 1957), Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of Colombia (1957), and Joaquín Balaguer of the Dominican Republic (1962). In addition, at least four (an exhaustive search of available sources might reveal more) faced unsuccessful

attempts to force them out by the same means: Juan de Dios Martínez Mera of Ecuador (1933), Carlos Mendieta of Cuba (1935), Tiburcio Cariás Andino of Honduras (1944), and Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua (1944). A chronological summary of these events appears at the end of this essay.<sup>3</sup>

In the pages that follow, I will consider the context in which these civic strikes occurred and compare the social composition of the opposition movements, the leadership of and participation in the strikes themselves, and the use or non-use of violence by the insurgents. Finally, I will consider what factors accounted for the success or failure of these insurrectionary civic strikes.

### The Latin American Context

These movements belonged to a regional tradition of popular uprisings dating back to the *tumultos* (riots) of colonial times. Commenting on the paradoxical prevalence of both authoritarian rulers and revolts against established governments in Latin America, Richard Morse observed that while

Latin-American peoples still appear willing to alienate, rather than delegate, power to their chosen or accepted leaders, . . . the people retain also a keen sense of equity, of natural justice, and their sensitivity to abuses of alienated power. It may be that the classic image of the Latin-American "revolution" is the barracks coup by an insurgent *caudillo* against an incumbent whose authority lacks legitimacy. But the more significant if more infrequent uprising is that having a broad popular base and no clearly elaborated program beyond reclamation of sovereignty that has been tyrannically abused. . . .

. . . A "legitimate" revolution in Latin America needs no sharp-edged ideology; it need not polarize the classes; it need not produce an immediate and effective redistribution of wealth and goods. . . .

On the other hand, a legitimate revolution probably necessitates generalized violence and popular participation, even

though under improvised leadership and with unprogrammed goals. It needs to be informed by a deep even though unarticulated sense of moral urgency. It needs to be an indigenous movement, unencumbered by foreign support. It needs charismatic leadership of a special psycho-cultural appeal.<sup>4</sup>

In general, the revolts listed above conformed to Morse's description of "legitimate" revolution[s], but they differed in two important respects. None depended upon a charismatic leader. In every case, leadership was diffused among a number of persons, many of whom cannot even be identified by name. Moreover, while violent incidents occurred in the course of most of these uprisings, "generalized violence" occurred in fewer than half and was alien to their essential character. Rather, the rapid buildup of popular pressure for the removal of the president took the form of walkouts and shutdowns (usually accompanied by demonstrations and/or petitions) designed to dramatize public disapproval and threaten the regime's capacity to function. That the protagonists understood their key weapon as "going on strike" is clear from the use of the term "strike" (*grève, paro, or huelga*) in many of their statements, and in contemporary local accounts of the actions.

The appearance of this particular type of insurrection in Latin America reflected forces which made themselves felt at different dates and in varying degrees in each country. Throughout the nineteenth century large landowners backed by armies recruited from among their rural dependents effectively dominated the political process.<sup>5</sup> In the twentieth century, however, armies became professionalized, central governments exercised increasingly effective control over their territory, and cities—especially capital cities—grew. The urban groups which John J. Johnson classified as "middle sectors"—businessmen, professionals, bureaucrats, and technicians—assumed an expanding role in national politics.<sup>6</sup> The growing number of high school and university students, exposed to new intellectual currents and unencumbered by adult responsibilities, became conspicuous and influential agitators for change. The civic strike as insurrection belonged to a group of political phenomena which, Kalman Silvert wrote, characterized a stage of national development in which these groups were "growing and seeking an adjustment."<sup>7</sup> While they suf-

fered from an obvious disadvantage in armed conflict with the new professional armies in possession of sophisticated weaponry, the civic strike offered an effective way of manifesting the power they did have.

While the cases considered here ranged from one end of Latin America to the other, in Haiti as well as in Spanish-speaking republics, the countries in which they occurred shared certain characteristics. With the exception of Colombia and Chile, they numbered among the smaller Latin American republics in area, and, except for Colombia, all had populations of less than ten million in 1960. In most of these countries (the exceptions being Chile, El Salvador, Colombia, and Panama) urban groups not identified with the established oligarchies were just beginning to play a role in national politics at the time of the insurrection. Indeed, in three cases—Cuba in 1933, Guatemala in 1944, and Haiti in 1946—the insurrection itself marked the emergence of middle-sector constituencies as major participants in the political process.

Within the thirty-year period in which these cases occurred three waves of insurrectionary civic strikes are apparent: one in the era of the great depression, from 1931 to 1935, a second beginning near the end of World War II in 1944, and a third from 1956 to 1961. A number of Latin American governments were toppled by other means as well during each of these periods, which suggests that the civic strikes reflected, at least in part, conditions that affected the region as a whole.

Most occurred during periods of economic hardship, though the nature of the difficulties that beset the countries in question varied, and in most cases it is impossible to assess the extent to which economic discontent motivated the uprisings. An acute fiscal crisis brought on by the combination of sharply declining export earnings with enormous debts accumulated during the preceding boom period clearly precipitated the chain of events that led to the strike against President Ibáñez of Chile. The governments of Haiti in 1956-57 and Colombia in 1957 faced similar crises. Some commentators on the uprisings in Ecuador in 1933, Guatemala and Honduras in 1944, and Haiti in 1946 thought sharply rising living costs contributed to dissatisfaction with the governments in those countries, though other issues loomed much larger.<sup>8</sup>

Some of these insurrections were clearly linked together in chain reactions. The ouster of Machado led to years of conflict in Cuba, a

conflict which found expression in the 1935 civic strike. Similarly the downfall of Magloire of Haiti initiated a power struggle that led to civic strikes against two succeeding presidents.

In some cases a "demonstration effect" crossed national boundaries. The United States ambassador to Ecuador in 1933 noted that "the advocates of a general strike have not failed to call attention to the example set by the people of Habana." The civic strike against Martínez in El Salvador inspired attempts to unseat the governments of the other three Central American dictatorships.<sup>9</sup>

Of the fifteen presidents who became targets of insurrectionary strikes, ten—Ibáñez, Machado, Martínez, Ubico, Carías, Somoza, Lescot, Arias, Magloire, and Rojas Pinilla—ruled as dictators, or had seized dictatorial power when the insurrection broke out. A pattern of repression characterized all of these regimes, though the severity of repression varied significantly. Recurring elements in the pattern included spy systems or secret police, prohibition of labor unions and/or strikes, and prolonged rule under state of siege or martial law provisions. Most of these governments paralyzed opposition political parties through cooptation, intimidation, or outright suppression, and all of them imprisoned or exiled political opponents and silenced unwelcome press and/or radio comment.<sup>10</sup>

Nine of these dictators threatened to become permanently entrenched in the classic Latin American pattern known as *continuismo*. Subservient legislatures had passed constitutional amendments to extend the legal terms of Machado, Martínez, Ubico, Carías, Somoza, Lescot, and Rojas Pinilla. Since Arnulfo Arias and his brother Harmodio had monopolized the presidency of Panama for ten years (1931-1941), the former's grab for power in 1951 aroused fears of a new era of prolonged Arias rule.<sup>11</sup> Magloire's opponents, too, suspected that he intended to remain in office indefinitely.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, resentment of dictatorial rule and fear of its perpetuation motivated opposition to three of the five remaining presidents. The 1935 civic strike in Cuba was directed not at the civilian government (President Mendieta's name was never mentioned), but at the *de facto* military dictatorship of armed forces chief Fulgencio Batista, for which the civilian government was viewed as a facade. Opponents of Balaguer, the titular president who continued in office after the assassination of Dominican strongman Rafael Trujillo, attacked him as a holdover from the Trujillo regime. Similarly, Haitian opponents of

Pierre-Louis perceived him as lax about rooting out the delinquencies of the Magloire administration and feared he might be paving the way for Magloire's return or for the imposition of a presidential candidate associated with the deposed government.<sup>13</sup>

### **The Social Composition of the Opposition Movements**

Although several of the civic strikes apparently mushroomed spontaneously in response to unforeseen events, all except the insurrections against Pierre-Louis and Sylvain followed months or years of resistance to the regime in power. Opposition to these governments united quite diverse groups, as Frederick Pike's description of the alliance against Ibáñez of Chile illustrates:

Communist and other leftist elements wished to oust Ibáñez because of the repressive measures he had used against them. . . . the establishment of some sort of socialist dictatorship as well as the enactment of stringent curbs on foreign capital would have been to their general liking. Various elements in the Liberal Party opposed Ibáñez because of his interference with free enterprise capitalism and, in their opinion, excessive attention to the lower classes. . . . [they] wished to lure additional foreign capital by offering the most generous terms conceivable. . . . Many of the Democrats and a few Radicals . . . wanted to be rid of the dictator because they felt he had not done enough for the lower classes. [Many Conservatives] had concluded that the dictator would have to be overthrown before the union between Church and State could be reestablished, and the influence of social levelers crushed. The incipient Nazi movement wished the removal of Ibáñez on the grounds that he had betrayed the true principles of fascism.

. . . in all political parties there were opportunists who wanted to oust Ibáñez simply so that they might themselves reacquire power, as well as sincere defenders of democratic processes who hoped for the restoration of personal liberties and administrative integrity.<sup>14</sup>

All fifteen of these presidents alienated at least some elements of the upper class by excluding them from the privileges of public office and/or adopting policies that threatened their interests.<sup>15</sup> In four countries—Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Colombia—opposition leadership came primarily from traditional political parties directed by members of the local oligarchies. In Colombia, Tad Szulc observed, “the resistance to Rojas Pinilla was plotted in Bogota’s exclusive Jockey Club, in the board rooms of big corporations, in the banks, and in the offices of stockbrokers.”<sup>16</sup> Panama and the Dominican Republic lacked the permanent political parties of these countries, but the Panamanian oligarchy, as represented by the Congress and the Supreme Court, came into conflict with the president first and finally took the legal steps to remove him from office, while the anti-Balaguer Unión Cívica Nacional of the Dominican Republic was “basically oriented toward the upper class” and conservative in its ideas.<sup>17</sup> In Haiti, Senator Louis Dejouie, the presidential candidate who represented Haiti’s mulatto elite, played a major role in mobilizing opposition to Magloire, Pierre-Louis, and Sylvain.<sup>18</sup>

Elsewhere such elements played lesser roles in predominantly middle-sector opposition movements. Supporters of Chilean ex-President Arturo Alessandri, whose Radical party constituted a classic middle-sector alliance, conspired against Ibáñez for several years before his downfall.<sup>19</sup> The leading figure in the non-partisan Unión Civilista (Civil Union) which organized the civic strike was a well-known physician active in the Radical party, and most of its members “came from the professional classes—physicians, lawyers, accountants, engineers, and architects.”<sup>20</sup> In Cuba young professionals organized the ABC terrorist society, the most influential of the numerous anti-Machado organizations, and in 1935 joined the new middle-sector Auténtico (Authentic Revolutionary) party in opposition to Mendieta. Salvadoran professionals and the press formed the hard core of opposition to Martínez. Guatemalan lawyers were the first to challenge the Ubico government openly, a month before the civic strike, and professionals formed the nucleus of an incipient political party organized in the same period, which played a leading role in bringing down Ubico.<sup>21</sup> The Dominican Unión Cívica Nacional, its alleged ties to the oligarchy notwithstanding, also exhibited some of the characteristics of a middle-sector alliance. By the time of the strike it “enjoyed the support of . . . more than 30 professional, student,

labor, and commercial organizations" with business and professional groups predominating.<sup>22</sup>

The Haitian revolution of 1946 is universally recognized as a revolt against the domination of the mulatto elite; what organized opposition to Lescot existed before the outburst of that year came principally from a new black middle class.<sup>23</sup> François Duvalier's Parti du Peuple Haïtien (Haitian People's Party) and its sometime ally-sometime rival, the smaller Mouvement Ouvrier et Paysan (Worker and Peasant Movement) of Daniel Fignole, both of which drew their support from urban black constituencies, led the opposition to Magloire in alliance with Dejoie. They enjoyed the collaboration of the journalists' and the lawyers' associations and the Port-au-Prince business community.<sup>24</sup> Duvalier and Dejoie were the leading opponents of Pierre-Louis, while Fignole joined Dejoie and other rivals of Duvalier in the attack on Sylvain.<sup>25</sup>

Students and youth played a key role in almost all of the anti-dictator alliances. Haitian students produced the journals *Zinglins*, which challenged the Lescot regime as early as May 1945, and *La Ruche (The Hive)*, whose articles precipitated the final crisis of that government.<sup>26</sup> In Cuba the Directorio Estudiantil Universitario (University Student Directorate) was among the first groups to oppose Machado. Although the government closed the university in October 1930, the DEU remained a major element in the resistance. Students dominated the reformist government of Ramón Grau San Martín, which ruled briefly after the fall of Machado, and opposed Mendieta from the time he took office as Grau's successor in January 1934. In Chile, El Salvador, and Colombia the governments of Ibáñez, Martínez, and Rojas Pinilla had to contend with challenges from students long before the insurrections against them erupted, while in Guatemala an escalating student campaign for reform of the National University precipitated the insurrection.<sup>27</sup> Student groups participated in the Dominican Unión Cívica Nacional, as did the Fourteenth of June Movement (*Catorcitas*), a group of students and young professional people originally organized to fight Trujillo. Young people comprised a significant element in the following of Duvalier, and youth groups, the Congrès de la Jeunesse of Haiti and the Frente Patriótica de la Juventud of Panama, figured in the opposition to Magloire and Arias.<sup>28</sup>

In the majority of cases the opposition included some elements of

organized labor. Unions figured prominently in the resistance to Machado, Mera, and Mendieta. They supported the movements against Rojas Pinilla, Balaguer, and probably also Magloire, Pierre Louis, and Sylvain, since both Duvalier and Fignole counted labor organizations among their constituents.<sup>29</sup> The role of unions in Panama is unclear, but “union members” reportedly shifted from support of Arias to opposition during the 1951 crisis.<sup>30</sup> Although official persecution and internal feuding nearly destroyed the independent Chilean unions during the Ibáñez period, some “labor leaders” reportedly participated in the *Unión Civilista*.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, in El Salvador, where the Martínez regime had suppressed unions, the opposition included people involved in the legal workers’ mutual aid societies and in clandestine labor organizing.<sup>32</sup>

### Civic Strike Leadership and Participation

An examination of the origin and development of the civic strikes themselves brings several significant characteristics of these movements into focus. The uprising usually began outside of established opposition organizations. Students and women frequently played leading roles. Participation in the strikes came predominantly from merchants, members of the professions, and “white-collar” employees rather than from members of “working-class” occupations.

Existing opposition organizations started only four of the fifteen civic strikes considered here: the three in Haiti in 1956 and 1957, and in the Dominican Republic. In eight cases—Chile, Cuba in 1935, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti in 1946, and Colombia—the action began with student demonstrations and/or student strikes. Other elements of the population then joined in, either spontaneously or as a result of organizing by students and adult opposition groups, notably the *Unión Civilista* of Chile and the incipient Social Democratic party of Guatemala. Although the origin of the civic strike in Panama is obscure, students reportedly joined housewives and union members in organizing the demonstrations with which it began.<sup>33</sup> The insurrection against Machado started with labor strikes, and in Ecuador, Quito unions set up the committee that called the general strike against President Mera.

Processions organized by women marked the insurrections in

Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. A march by women and children probably also took place in El Salvador before the students declared themselves on strike, and women played key roles in organizing the strikes in El Salvador and Guatemala.<sup>34</sup> In Honduras, where opposition mobilization began with a women's march for the release of political prisoners two months before the student strike, women joined students in the first openly anti-Carías demonstration.<sup>35</sup>

Participation in the strikes reflected the character of the cities in which they took place, essentially centers of government, commerce, and services rather than of industry. In most cases shopkeepers closed their doors, although some may have done so more out of fear of street violence than in support of the strikes. While the walkout in Honduras did not go beyond the medical and engineering students, opposition organizers directed their strike appeals primarily to shop owners, and the authorities in both Honduras and Nicaragua went to some lengths to keep commercial establishments open.<sup>36</sup> In El Salvador, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic business owners financed the movement both by paying their own employees for the enforced vacations and by contributing to the expenses of the movement.<sup>37</sup>

Professional people—in particular, lawyers, physicians, dentists, pharmacists, engineers, and architects—constituted the next most prominent category of participants. Members of at least some of these groups joined in most of the civic strikes; they started the strike against Magloire and took the lead, after the students, in the civic strikes against Ibáñez, Martínez, Somoza García, Ubico, and Rojas Pinilla.

Several groups of white-collar workers played conspicuous enough parts to merit specific mention in accounts of various civic strikes. These included school teachers and employees of banks and other commercial establishments, newspapers, and telephone companies. Walkouts by civil servants crippled government functions in Cuba in 1935, El Salvador, three of the four Haitian cases, and the Dominican Republic.

Blue-collar workers most frequently mentioned as participants in the strikes included bus and/or streetcar operators, railroad workers, and dock workers. The accounts examined contain only scattered references to the participation of people in other service occupations, such as delivery truck drivers, hotel and restaurant employees, butch-

ers, bakers, and barbers, though in fact they may have joined a number of the general shutdowns. Manufacturing industries appear to have been seriously affected by strikes only in Cuba, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and possibly Colombia, and in the two latter countries work stoppages probably resulted from the decisions of management rather than workers.

In general, working-class participation in the civic strikes lagged behind that of middle-sector groups. None at all materialized in Chile, Honduras, or Nicaragua.<sup>38</sup> Only in Cuba did the national labor federation actually call a general strike, and even there evidence as to the role of the Cuban Confederation of Labor (CNO) in 1935 is unclear. Although some important labor organizations supported the strike, the CNO leadership appears to have been divided, and very late in issuing a strike order, if it ever did at all.<sup>39</sup> In Ecuador, the Quito union representatives who organized the civic strike tried in vain to enlist the support of unions in other cities and were unable to keep the strike going for the three days originally planned in Quito.<sup>40</sup>

Pro-labor gestures on the part of the Ibañez regime may account for the slow working-class response to the Chilean civic strike. Somoza had courted Nicaragua's infant labor movement, which actually mobilized it *in favor* of the government when opponents tried to organize a civic strike.<sup>41</sup> The low level of working-class involvement in civic strikes also reflected the weakness of labor organizations and factional fights within them, as well as high unemployment and low wages, which made employees reluctant to lose time from work, and disinterest in issues that had no visible connection with the needs of people struggling for the bare necessities of life. Juan Bosch recalled that his Dominican Revolutionary Party, which appealed primarily to the urban and rural poor, opposed the civic strike of 1961 because the Unión Cívica Nacional's focus on personalities obscured the need for social and economic reform and "the people, the mass, had no stake in these maneuvers."<sup>42</sup>

Indeed, the absence of economic and social demands constituted another notable characteristic of these insurrections. Leaflets, petitions, and speeches concentrated on political grievances against the government—demanding freedom for political prisoners, the return of constitutional freedoms, and/or free elections—and sounded traditional liberal themes. Demonstrators shouted "'We want liberty!'" in Chile and "'Long live freedom! Down with the Tyrant!'" in Haiti.<sup>43</sup>

The insurrectionary movements of 1944 in Central America and of 1946 in Haiti echoed World War II democratic propaganda, appealing to the authority of the Atlantic Charter and Franklin Roosevelt's "four freedoms."<sup>44</sup> But every insurrection focused primarily on the one objective which united all segments of the opposition: the removal of the president.

### **The Use or Non-use of Violence by Insurgents**

The extent and character of violence used by the insurgents varied considerably, and the interpretation of reports of violence and casualty figures is complicated by the fact that in some cases—Cuba in 1933, Haiti in 1946, Colombia, and (according to some accounts) Chile—serious outbursts of mob violence occurred immediately *after* the removal of the dictator.

Cuban opponents of both Machado and Mendieta employed terrorist tactics, but while the ABC society's two-year campaign of "running gun battles. . . , bombing, and political assassination" no doubt contributed to the collapse of the Machado government's authority, these activities played no role in the August 1933 insurrection.<sup>45</sup> The ABC society suspended them in July 1933 at the onset of the United States ambassador's effort to mediate between Machado and the opposition. Other organizations were not parties to the ceasefire, and the strike was accompanied by attacks on vehicles, policemen, and strike-breakers. Supporters of the strike threatened shopkeepers and at least one group of workers.<sup>46</sup> On the other hand, Alberto Lamar Schweyer's pro-Machado account of the 1933 strike emphasized that violent incidents were very few, and the United States ambassador also reported "general tranquillity" during the strike.<sup>47</sup>

In 1935, the student committee that initiated and led the civic strike against the Mendieta regime evidently saw it as part of a strategy that also included violent tactics. The committee may have envisioned a full-scale armed insurrection; certainly some of its allies did. Arms were stockpiled (and discovered) in the university. The strike was marked by the explosion of innumerable bombs, attacks on policemen, at least two murders of security officers, and the use of threats to make workers and drivers of vehicles comply with the strike call.<sup>48</sup> However, the insurgents of 1935 did not actually mount major

military operations, probably because they were not sufficiently united or prepared, and in spite of the violence noted above, one reporter concluded that the "movement . . . throughout was substantially one of passive resistance."<sup>49</sup>

In Chile, the students who began the insurrection against Ibáñez staged a symbolic armed confrontation with the police by defending the university building they occupied until they ran out of ammunition. In the words of H. Ochoa Mena, a participant in the subsequent strike, the siege of the university was "ridiculous" as a military action.<sup>50</sup> It was a dangerous piece of theater which captured the imagination of the inhabitants of Santiago precisely because it brought such unequal forces into play, and thereby served to raise the flag of revolt.

A few snipers fired on policemen from buildings in Santiago. The bank clerks (whose call to *nonviolent* resistance is quoted below [p. 15]) and the secondary school teachers armed themselves against the police, though they seem to have envisioned only defensive action.<sup>51</sup>

In addition to these obviously mixed tactics, rioting serious enough to cause a number of injuries and deaths occurred in at least four cases: Chile, Haiti in 1946, Panama, and Colombia. However, the fact that civilians sustained most of the casualties indicates that few had firearms, and the outbursts reflected no strategy or intent.<sup>52</sup> Ochoa Mena's analysis of the streetfighting in Santiago probably explains most of the violence in other cases as well:

These street riots always started the same way. The people circulated around the troops. Spirits heated up and turned aggressive on both sides. The troops at every moment felt encouraged and ready to attack. Because of the fact that they had arms they felt protected and the task appeared easy. The civilians also showed themselves anxious and inclined to commotion and attack. Any incident, someone being arrested, a shout, an insulting word, lit the fire and the clash resulted.<sup>53</sup>

News reports of "violence" and high casualty figures do not of themselves constitute proof of any physical aggression at all by the insurgents, however, for in some cases evidence indicates that security forces attacked nonviolent demonstrators and even innocent bystanders. Such unprovoked assaults on civilians probably accounted for all

of the casualties in Honduras and the Dominican Republic; most, if not all, in Guatemala, and many in the reported "riots" mentioned earlier. In most of the insurrections, acts of violence by the insurgents were limited to isolated incidents unrepresentative of the spirit and intent of the movement as a whole.

Some insurgent leaders explicitly disavowed violence, and a few took more concrete action to prevent it. When the Haitian government forbade political meetings on the pretext of a wave of bombings in early December 1956, a group of dissident political candidates issued a statement dissociating themselves from "'the acts of terrorism which are darkening the political atmosphere,'" and affirming their desire "'to pursue our struggle for the triumph of Democracy within the framework of the Constitution and the laws.'"<sup>54</sup> In Colombia the opposition clandestine radio broadcast the appeal of the heads of the Conservative and Liberal parties, Guillermo León Valencia and Alberto Lleras Camargo:

We ask that the movement maintain itself in peace as a legitimate resistance . . . without offering a target for bullets. Even the murders which are being committed must not make us lose our heads. We reject the violence which is used on us and we do not want any of our people to use it. The effectiveness of the action of the Colombian people against a government which oppresses it by force lies solely in its moral resistance.<sup>55</sup>

Leaders of the opposition to Machado and Balaguer broadcast appeals to their supporters to stay off the streets during the civic strikes, and Dominican Unión Cívica Nacional representatives repeatedly intervened to calm angry crowds, as did student organizers in El Salvador. Immediately after Ubico resigned, Guatemalan students distributed leaflets "urging the public to continue 'its dignified and peaceful attitude and to avoid any incivil or hostile act that might prejudice the happy accomplishment of our objects. . . .'"<sup>56</sup>

Moreover, as the quotations from the Guatemalan and Colombian leaders suggest, the instigators of some civic strikes perceived them as the exercise of a kind of power fundamentally different from that of physical force. The use of the term "*huelga de brazos caídos*," variously

translated as “arms down,” “peaceful demonstration of protest,” “peaceful strike of . . . fallen arms,” and “passive strike,” to describe the strikes in Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia implied a conscious choice of nonviolent action.<sup>57</sup> While the origin of the expression is obscure, and it defies precise definition, the Spanish anarcho-syndicalist, Diego Abad de Santillán, in a theoretical discussion of general strikes, distinguished between those of *brazos caídos* and those characterized by sabotage and fighting.<sup>58</sup> A leaflet calling on Chilean bank employees to strike drew the distinction explicitly:

WITHOUT ARMS, WITH IDEALS ALONE WE WILL OVERTHROW  
THE MURDERERS AND THIEVES.

. . . Yes, comrades, peaceful struggle is necessary since we do not have violent means to overthrow the TYRANT.

WE ARE GOING TO STRIKE. LET US PARALYZE THE NATION. . . .

If you are Patriots and if you are conscious of your civic duties and your responsibility for the future of Chile and of your descendants, grasp the arm of passive resistance. . . .<sup>59</sup>

### **Factors Accounting for Success or Failure**

To explain how the civic strikes achieved their objectives we must begin by identifying the actors who were affected: the presidents themselves, the heads of the armed forces and—in two cases—the United States.

Five of the eleven presidents who left office in the wake of civic strikes—Ibañez, Martínez, Ubico, Magloire, and Pierre-Louis—chose to resign, although both Ibañez and Martínez may have been influenced by doubts about the reliability of their armed forces.<sup>60</sup> Five—Machado, Lescot, Arias, Sylvain, and Rojas Pinilla—were clearly forced out by their military commanders.<sup>61</sup> Balaguer finally accepted a compromise agreement on his early departure only after the United States brought strong pressure to bear on both him and the Dominican military. The United States seems also to have given impetus to the

removal of Machado, though its role was less direct than in the Dominican Republic.<sup>62</sup> What led these actors to make the crucial decisions?

In explaining the victory of the insurrection against Ibáñez, Ochoa Mena distinguished between two phases of the movement: the action in the streets and the strike. The former, in his opinion, was of "relatively little importance" and "could not by itself have overthrown the Dictatorship," for the government had at its disposal sufficient armed force to crush it. But the strike threatened to deny the regime that which sustained its very existence—the collaboration of citizens in carrying on the life of society. In his words:

The tyranny could only exist because it had the support of the armed forces. But the armed forces are far from representing a considerable social energy within the state. On the contrary, their influence is insignificant in relation to other groups whose energies are capable of maintaining the state by themselves. . . . It happened that the population, or at least an important part of it, withdrew its support from the government. And then the government was undermined at its foundations, it lost all its influence, all its power. . . . What good was brute force to the government? None.<sup>63</sup>

A more elaborate version of this theory developed by the North American specialist on nonviolent action, Gene Sharp, offers some conceptual tools for analyzing the dynamics of insurrectionary civic strikes in general. Like Ochoa Mena, Sharp maintains that the ability of any government to impose its will depends upon the habitual cooperation of citizens who accept its right to command and provide it with a wide range of services and material resources which it must have in order to function. It may employ sanctions to compel the cooperation of recalcitrant subjects, but the effectiveness of those sanctions depends upon the willingness and ability of some element in the population to carry them out and the unwillingness of the subjects to endure them. Lacking these conditions a regime becomes vulnerable to a mechanism Sharp calls "nonviolent coercion," which

. . . may take place in any of three ways: 1) the defiance may

become too widespread and massive to be controlled by the opponent's repression; 2) the noncooperation and defiance may make it impossible for the social, economic and political system to operate unless the actionist's demands are achieved; 3) even the opponent's ability to apply repression may be undermined and may at times dissolve. . . .

More specifically,

A withdrawal . . . by key personnel, technicians, officers, administrators, etc., of their assistance to the opponent (or their *reduced* assistance) may have an impact on the opponent's power quite disproportionate to the numbers actually noncooperating.

Refusal of assistance by key subjects may make it difficult for the opponent to develop and carry out policies appropriate to the situation he faces. This may lead to the acceptance of policies which prove to be political mistakes or to an inability to implement chosen policies, or difficulties in doing so. . . .

The opponent's ability to apply sanctions may . . . be influenced by the degree to which his agents of repression—police and troops—are willing to carry out orders. . . . [They may] decline to carry out orders efficiently, or refuse them completely—i.e. mutiny.<sup>64</sup>

All of these elements of nonviolent coercion appeared in one or another of the successful civic strikes. Several accounts attest to frustration on the part of police and soldiers before massive civilian resistance. On the eve of Ibáñez' resignation, "Infantry and artillery commanders were . . . apathetic and *realized the hopelessness of the situation.*" "Machado once more ordered his soldiers to 'restore public order,'" Ruby Hart Phillips wrote on August 6, 1933, "but the soldiers are *perfectly helpless in the present situation.*" Ubico's government "found itself *powerless to cope with the situation.*" In Colombia, troops were exhausted by dealing with the constant demonstrations, and the

armed forces chiefs decided to oust Rojas Pinilla after the head of the national police "returned from Cali to report the situation there as hopeless."<sup>65</sup>

Several of the target governments lost the support of key civilian collaborators. Ibáñez represented the most extreme case, facing the resignation of two entire cabinets in two days, followed by the shutdown of the courts in Santiago and the resignation of local officials in at least one provincial city. Close associates reluctantly concluded that only his departure could resolve the crisis, and in the end Ibáñez "complained that the only influential person on whose support he could count" was the military commander of Santiago.<sup>66</sup> Similarly, the cabinets of Martínez and Lescot resigned, and Lescot found himself unable to form another.

A few reports pointed to the unreliability of "agents of repression" in the face of civic strikes. Salvadoran police who caught strike organizers let them go. Some Haitian soldiers refused to fire on demonstrators in 1946, and Colombian soldiers "unenthusiastically and half-heartedly attempt[ed] to quell disturbances."<sup>67</sup>

An examination of three of the unsuccessful civic strikes supports the thesis that victory resulted from a level of citizen defiance which directly or indirectly made it impossible for the president to govern. No general shutdown developed in Honduras, and the limited strikes in Ecuador and Nicaragua could not have had much impact on critical resources which the governments of those countries required to survive. Moreover, demonstrations in these cases were less than massive, and they soon lost momentum.

It is harder to explain the failure of the Cuban civic strike of 1935, which enlisted nationwide participation of many segments of the workforce, paralyzing foreign trade and transportation. At the height of the 1935 strike, according to one account, "Cuba was at a standstill as complete as that in August 1933."<sup>68</sup> Walkouts by civil servants paralyzed ten of its twelve government departments, and eight members of Mendieta's cabinet resigned. United States State Department sources concluded "that the president had lost the support of virtually all elements in Cuba except his own party, and even that was split...."<sup>69</sup> Yet the Mendieta regime survived.

The Cuban government's response to this crisis was unique in the range of repressive tactics it employed. Mass arrests, indefinite detention, murders of opposition activists, the occupation of the university,

and prohibition of public gatherings undoubtedly made it difficult for dissident groups to function and terrorized many disaffected citizens. Troops took over some public services and compelled reluctant employees to work, literally at gunpoint. Striking unions were dissolved, and individual workers were threatened with imprisonment and even death if their actions interrupted certain essential services. Obviously such measures could not restore normal life in Cuba, but they did serve to aggravate weaknesses in the insurrectionary movement, break its morale, and shift the balance of power in favor of the government.

Other governments facing civic strikes tried various of these measures. The Machado government locked in electric and telephone company employees. It also attempted to round up strikers, as did the Salvadoran police. The military took over some public services in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. Arrests occurred almost everywhere, and demonstrators were attacked with varying degrees of brutality in Chile, Cuba in 1933, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti in 1946, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. No other government, however, displayed the ruthless efficiency, thoroughness, and determination of the Mendieta/Batista regime.

This suggests that what actually accounted for both the voluntary resignations of some presidents and military intervention against others was a process short of nonviolent coercion which Sharp calls "accommodation," and explains as follows:

In the mechanism of accommodation the opponent resolves to grant the demands of the nonviolent actionists . . . rather than to risk or to experience some other condition or result regarded as still more unsatisfactory. The main reason for this new willingness to yield is the changed social situation produced by the nonviolent action. . . .

In nonviolent coercion the changes are made when the opponent no longer has an effective choice between conceding or refusing to accept the demands. In accommodation, however, although the change is made in response to the altered situation, it is made while the opponent still has an effective choice before him, and before significant nonviolent coercion takes place.<sup>70</sup>

Precisely how the changed situations created by the civic strikes brought about choices for accommodation is necessarily a matter of speculation, but evidence from various cases points to several factors: the perception that further efforts at repression would involve unacceptable loss of life, the attitude that suppressing the uprising was simply not worth the trouble, the exacerbation of existing disaffection between the president and the military, and calculations by military leaders as to where their interests lay.

According to one account of Ibáñez's resignation, unwillingness to countenance more bloodshed constituted a major factor in his surrender. Raúl Marín Balmaceda quoted Ibáñez as saying on the day of his resignation,

In these moments no way remains for me except to defend myself with fire and blood, but I will leave before I will do that because I do not want people to go on falling in the streets. . . .

. . . This can't go on: every day a funeral. . . . What can I have done to deserve so much hatred?<sup>71</sup>

In the face of general revulsion against the execution of participants in an earlier armed uprising, the Martínez government followed a policy of trying to placate its opponents and avoid violence during the civic strike. After police killed one civilian and demonstrators appeared in the streets of San Salvador, Martinez's cabinet resigned, telling the president that it could not support the use of armed force against civilians. Martínez himself rejected the suggestion of the army chief of staff that he order troops to fire on the crowds. He said after his resignation that a movement which included women and "youths who did not completely realize what they were doing" offered no target for a soldier.<sup>72</sup>

Future president Paul Magloire, one of the military triumvirate that ousted Lescot (and himself a member of Haiti's rising black elite), told Robert Rotberg that the only alternative would have been "to use . . . troops against the strikers, and Magloire temperamentally and strategically was opposed to the employment of such tactics on behalf of a regime which had hitherto neglected blacks."<sup>73</sup>

When Magloire himself faced a civic strike "he was reported to

have been impressed by assertions that his assumption of [dictatorial] powers was so unpopular that if he remained in office violence could break out." But in this case aversion to bloodshed probably merged with the feeling that remaining in office was not worth the trouble. In Rotberg's words, "Magloire . . . confessed to like the good life too much to fight back against difficult odds."<sup>74</sup> Pierre-Louis, who resigned before the civic strike against his rule even began, may have done so out of a similar disinclination to struggle.

Some opposition to Rojas Pinilla had existed in the Colombian military establishment for months before the civilian insurrection. As the strike developed, more officers were alienated by Rojas Pinilla's nationalization of the banks to keep them open, and they worried about the growth of antimilitary public sentiment.<sup>75</sup> The civilian action thus served to strengthen the position of those officers who themselves wanted a change of government.

The Haitian military arrested President Sylvain on charges of complicity in a bomb plot, but the timing of its action (as well as the lack of concrete evidence connecting him with the bomb factory it had found) suggest that the Garde d'Haïti intervened in the hope of appeasing contentious political factions. Presumably the chief of staff saw this course as more appropriate and/or easier than trying to repress the opponents of Sylvain. Panamanian police chief Remón, who had been a president-maker for several years and would soon run for the presidency himself, obviously "swung to the popular side" after the general public and the civilian authorities declared themselves against Arias.<sup>76</sup>

The preservation of the Cuban military's privileges dictated timely action against Machado. It faced the possibility that the United States might send troops to Cuba, or, short of this eventuality, that the United States ambassador's mediation effort would result in an agreement inimical to the interests of the armed forces. Moreover, the officers feared that the civilian insurrection might become uncontrollable and lead to more radical changes than the removal of Machado.

The ambassador also worried about the possibly revolutionary consequences of the strike. It pushed him to intervene actively to secure Machado's immediate departure, although his earlier strategy had been to seek a gradual, constitutional way to ease the dictator out.<sup>77</sup>

Similarly, the insurrection led by the Unión Cívica Nacional in the

Dominican Republic forced the hand of the United States, which for some months after the death of Trujillo favored Balaguer's continuation in office until a new president could be elected. Its overriding concern was to prevent the emergence of a "Castroite movement" by promoting the "gradual liberalization of the Trujillo structure" without moving "so quickly that the United States and the Dominican 'moderates' would lose control."<sup>78</sup> By November 1961 the United States had become involved in negotiations between Balaguer and the opposition to create a new interim government, though it is not altogether clear when the State Department decided that Balaguer would have to go.<sup>79</sup> At any rate, the collapse of the agreement that ended the civic strike in December was the last straw. All the leverage in the hands of the Dominican Republic's giant neighbor—support for ending the sanctions the Organization of American States had imposed on the Trujillo regime, recognition of the interim government, resumption of U.S.-Dominican trade, and the implicit threat of warships lying off the coast of the island—came into play.

Why was this intervention needed to make Balaguer reach an accommodation with opponents who were strong enough to paralyze the country for ten days? Why did no accommodation at all take place in Cuba in 1935?

These cases differed from the others considered here in that the position of the military itself was at issue. What became the movement to oust Mendieta began even before he took office, when maneuvering by armed forces commander Batista forced out provisional president Grau San Martín, and employees of several government departments walked out "in protest against Colonel Batista, whom [sic] they declared had made himself military dictator of the Republic." In 1935 striking students demanded an end to military rule, and the *New York Times* correspondent in Havana concluded that the fundamental cause of the insurrection "lies in the animosity of the people against the armed forces . . . which are declared to be spending the nation's revenues lavishly."<sup>80</sup> The Dominican armed forces, "necessarily implicated in the past of the Trujillo regime," reportedly "fear[ed] that an opposition government [would] take measures against military leaders," and while the leadership of the Unión Cívica Nacional denied that it had such designs, its president in the course of the strike "asserted that any settlement must not subordinate the civil power to the military."<sup>81</sup> Thus, while in other situations military

commanders preserved, and indeed enhanced, their political power by standing aside or joining the insurrection, they did not have the same option in these cases. From their point of view the issue was "them or us."

In this respect, as in others, insurrectionary civic strikes fit neatly into Charles Anderson's classic model of a peculiarly Latin American political system as he saw it in the mid-1960s. In this system, he wrote,

government is based on a flexible coalition among diverse power contenders which is subject to revision at any time if the terms under which the original government was formed are deemed violated. Revision occurs primarily when an existing holder of an important power capability feels threatened by action of government.

Each contender for a share in governmental decisionmaking seeks recognition of its claim by demonstrating to the others a "power capability" which need not actually be used. Various forms of direct action, whether violent or nonviolent, constitute acceptable ways of doing this, and

when such techniques as manifestation, strike, and even violence are used symbolically, that is, as the demonstration and not the use of a power capability, there would seem to be an *a priori* case that the appropriate response of government leaders should be conciliation and bargaining.

New contenders enter the game when they "demonstrate possession of a power capability sufficient to pose a threat to the existing contenders," while at the same time convincing the latter that they are

willing to permit existing contenders to continue to exist and operate in the political system. If the first condition is not fulfilled, the power contender will be ignored. . . . If the second condition is not fulfilled, efforts will be made to suppress the new power contender.<sup>82</sup>

In the terms of Anderson's theory, an insurrectionary civic strike constituted a show of power that usually came into play when impor-

tant participants in the political game perceived a dictator or potential dictator as a serious menace to their interests. It united a broad spectrum of constituencies, from conservative oligarchic elements to organized labor, around a platform that focused on the single objective of bringing down the president and appealed to liberal democratic values. Typically, the leadership and most of the troops came from the middle sectors—students, professionals, local businesspeople, and white-collar employees—with the support of some urban workers, and on occasion the resulting accommodation admitted these groups to the ongoing political game.

The success of such an insurrection depended upon the demonstration of a serious potential for nonviolent coercion. However, in those cases in which another important participant in the game—the military establishment—perceived the stakes as too high to permit accommodation, the insurgents proved unable to muster enough coercive power to bring down the government.

The model of civilian uprising defined here developed under specific historical conditions which in most Latin American countries have changed significantly in the last two decades. The individual strongman against whom diverse groups can unite is a nearly extinct species. The common political norms around which opponents of dictatorship rallied have to some extent given way to ideologies reflecting incompatible interests and increasing polarization. While a few insurrectionary civic strikes served as the entering wedge for new groups in the political arena and thus gave impetus to some measure of social change, their protagonists did not contemplate the drastic redistribution of wealth and power which is today the most critical issue in the region. Nevertheless, as the fall of the Bolivian military government before a wave of civic strikes in 1982 demonstrated, the insurrectionary potential of the civic strike is by no means a thing of the past.<sup>83</sup>

# **CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF INSURRECTIONARY CIVIC STRIKES**

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**1931**

## **CHILE**

July 13            In the face of acute financial crisis, President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo appoints a new cabinet committed to the restoration of constitutional liberties.

July 14            Government announces a moratorium on payment of its foreign debt.

July 17            Cabinet releases figures on the government's indebtedness and projected deficit and proposes austerity measures.  
Opponents of Ibáñez found Unión Civilista to resist any return to dictatorial rule.

July 21            Cabinet resigns because of differences with Ibáñez.  
Spontaneous protest demonstrations raise the demand for the resignation of Ibáñez.  
The Unión Civilista sets up commissions to prepare for action.  
Anti-Ibáñez demonstrations begin.

July 22            National University students declare themselves on strike and occupy main university building.  
Unión Civilista decides to organize a strike to bring down Ibáñez.  
National and Catholic university students meeting jointly call for a strike by all citizens and set up commissions to seek cooperation of professional organizations and workers.

July 23	Assembly of physicians declares its solidarity with the students, calls for resignation of Ibáñez, and declares readiness to strike in defense of constitutional guarantees.
	Second cabinet resigns.
	New cabinet threatens to use force to dislodge students occupying the university.
	At the university, students and police exchange fire.
July 24	Press censorship is reinstated.
	Fighting intensifies. Three civilians and a policeman are killed.
	Physicians agree on collective resignation of medical faculty of the National University and physicians employed by the government, as well as suspension of all but emergency medical service.
	Lawyers and architects vote to strike.
	Government cuts off electricity and water at the university.
	Resolution calling on the president to resign is introduced in the Chamber of Deputies.
	After protracted negotiations students leave university premises.
July 25	Shops in Santiago are closed.
	Courts shut down.
	Dentists, primary and secondary school teachers, pharmacists, accountants, bank employees, and other commercial employees declare themselves on strike.
	Engineers vote to suspend work, cutting off light and water in Santiago, as of Monday, July 27.
	Reports circulate that bakers, slaughterhouse workers, and railroad workers will stop work as of July 27.
July 26	Ibáñez resigns.

1933

CUBA

July 27 Havana bus drivers unite in a strike for various demands.

July 29 Intercity bus drivers strike in support of Havana bus drivers.

August 1      Soldiers fire on demonstrators in Havana, killing two. In Santa Clara, shops and theaters close and local transportation stops to protest attack on a group of striking teachers. In Pinar del Rio, transportation workers, tobacco workers, and journalists declare themselves on strike. The sugar workers' union organizes demonstrations and hunger marches throughout the country.

August 2      Taxi drivers and streetcar conductors in Havana suspend work.

August 3      Cuban Communist party manifesto in support of workers' demands also calls for an end to the Machado regime. Many stores in Havana close. Havana garages and gasoline stations refuse to sell oil and gasoline. Press reports many strikes underway in the interior.

August 4      In Havana, typographers and journalists stop work, ending publication of newspapers and magazines. Workers in the port of Havana walk out. Truckmen in Havana end deliveries of ice, milk, and bread. Shutdown of commerce in Havana becomes general. Garage owners refuse to buy gasoline from trucks escorted by soldiers. A central strike committee is organized. The Cuban Confederation of Labor (CNOC) calls for a general strike beginning August 5. Pinar del Rio is paralyzed.

August 5      Strikes are reported throughout Cuba. Many telegraph operators walk out to protest non-payment of their salaries. A leading weekly magazine calls for Machado's resignation. More than 100 labor leaders and other supporters of the strike are reported arrested.

August 6      Anti-Machado "ABC" radio urges public to join strike in order to oust Machado. Railroad service in eastern Cuba is suspended. Havana hotel and restaurant workers go on strike. Physicians vote to join strike.

**In Santiago, bus drivers, streetcar conductors, dock workers, and bakers vote to strike.**

In Camagüey, public transportation stops and telegraph messengers go on strike.

Mariano cigarmakers walk out.

Police try unsuccessfully to round up telegraph operators to force them to work.

U.S. ambassador, in capacity of "mediator" between government and opposition, proposes that Machado leave office.

August 7 Pro-government political parties give support to U.S. ambassador's proposal.

**Employees of Sanitation, Communications, and Treasury Departments go on strike, ending telegraph service and refuse collection.**

**Employees of Cuban Electric Company and Cuban Telephone Company are reported to be confined in their workplaces to prevent them from striking.**

Cienfuegos is shut down.

Police fire on crowd brought out by false report of Machado's resignation, killing some 20 people and wounding over 100.

**Congress suspends constitutional guarantees.**

In a radio speech, Machado announces his determination to resist U.S. intervention.

**August 8** The United States intensifies pressure on Machado.

**August 9(?)** CNOC agrees to end the strike in return for concessions to unions by Machado. Workers reject the agreement.

**August 9** Havana is placed under military control.

**August 11** The principal military units in Havana demand Machado's resignation.

**Machado resigns and leaves the country.**

## ECUADOR

August 15              Congress asks for the resignation of President Juan de Dios Martínez Mera.

**August 16** Mera refuses to resign.

August 19      Labor meeting in Quito endorses the position of Congress and sets up committee to plan a general strike.

August 28      Congress passes second resolution urging President to resign and declares a three-day recess to protest his failure to do so.  
Labor meeting in Quito declares a three-day strike.

August 29      Local transportation is suspended and stores close in Quito.  
Police disperse large gathering and arrest a number of people for promoting the strike and for alleged acts of violence.

August 30      Streetcar service in Quito resumes.  
Many stores reopen.  
Suspension of food deliveries causes price rises in the market.  
Strikers briefly cut off one electric line.  
Strike committee calls for suspension of strike.  
Shutdown begins in Riobamba.

August 31      Normal life resumes in Quito.  
In Riobamba, stores, workshops, factories, and offices close.  
Women in Riobamba lead a march through the city, ending with a speech by the president of the municipality.  
Two Riobamba police officials resign in solidarity with the people.

September 1     Quito government sends a new Intendant General of Police and fifty policemen to Riobamba.  
Quito strike committee declares the strike concluded.

## 1935

### CUBA

February 12     High school and normal (teacher-training) school students go on strike to protest the killing of a student by police.

February 12(?)   Teachers begin to walk out for payment of overdue sala-

ries, pay increases, and improvements in the public schools.

**February 13** Students at the national university declare a 72-hour strike to protest killing of the student and support demands made by teachers and students.

**February 14** National Confederation of Labor (CNOC) publishes statement of solidarity with the students.

**February 15** Schoolchildren join striking teachers, demonstrating for school breakfasts.

**February 16** Normal school administration declares a 48-hour strike. Two hundred teachers are arrested.

**February 18** More teachers strike, demanding increased appropriations for public schools.  
University students begin an indefinite strike, demanding an end to military rule in Cuba as well as a number of educational reforms.

**February 20** Cuban Revolutionary Party (Auténtico) urges public to support the students.

**February 21** University faculty declares support for political demands of the students and authorizes a commission to propose means of returning to constitutional order.

**February 22** Two professors accede to student demands that they resign from the president's cabinet.

**February 23** University Student Strike Committee issues a call for united action by all Cubans to end military dictatorship. National Kindergarten Association joins strike, making it complete among teachers and students.

**February 25** Students begin to enlist support for a civic strike. Some labor unions, including Havana Regional Labor Federation, pledge support.

**February 26** Two more cabinet ministers resign.

**February 27** Transportation workers begin to walk out. Minister of Labor resigns.

February 29      ABC, Auténtico, and *Menocalista* (conservative) political groups join in proposing a government to take over in the event of President Mendieta's resignation.

March 2      Drivers of interurban trucks strike.  
Railroad brotherhood votes support of strike.

March 5      Minister of Education resigns.

March 6      Confederation of professional groups votes support of student demands.  
Student Strike Committee manifesto calls for a civic strike.  
Employees of ministries of Labor, Treasury, Education, and Commerce stop working.  
Newspaper employees strike.  
Work stops at the port of Havana.  
Cabinet approves order closing any newspaper that publishes "alarming news or items tending to incite the public to disorder."<sup>44</sup> It also agrees to replace striking government employees and gives teachers until March 11 to return to work.

March 7      Troops occupy the university.  
Telegraph operators are compelled to remain at work.  
Bureau of Internal Revenue employees in Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Santiago, and Santa Clara walk out.

March 8      Employees of the ministries of Justice, Communications, Agriculture, Health, Public Works, and Foreign Relations strike, leaving only two ministries functioning normally.  
Havana waterworks employees strike.  
Streetcar employees stop working.  
Remaining ports in the island shut down.  
Doctors, nurses, and interns at all Havana hospitals and staff of the government mental hospital strike.  
Three newspapers do not appear in protest against censorship.

March 9      Three opposition newspapers suspend publication.  
Operators of three bus routes near Havana stop working and take the busses home.  
Nurses and attendants at private clinics walk out.  
Streetcar and bus drivers in Santiago stage a one-hour strike.

Government suspends constitutional law and puts the country under military control.  
Mass arrests of opposition activists begin.

March 10

A state of seige is declared, accompanied by decrees forbidding public gatherings and permitting indefinite detention without charges.  
All employees of bus lines in Havana and its suburbs go on strike.  
Radio stations stop broadcasting news in support of the striking newspapers.  
Railroad service in eastern Cuba ends.  
Medical federation declares strike at all hospitals.  
Theater employees strike.  
Minister of Health resigns.  
University commission presents to political groups a plan for replacement of Mendieta government with an interim junta.  
First of numerous killings by security forces are reported.

March 11

All Havana commercial employees strike.  
Electric company workers walk out.  
The entire tobacco industry shuts down.  
Delivery trucks and the ferry in Havana stop running.  
Strike spreads to the province of Pinar del Rio and city of Camaguey.  
Minister of Interior resigns.  
Troops keep electric company employees under guard and take over a railroad.  
Minister of Labor announces dissolution of striking unions.  
Cabinet decrees imprisonment for striking government employees and death penalty for unauthorized possession of "explosives [or] flammable materials," sabotage, or "complicity in acts resulting in the interruption of light, power or water services or the distribution of foodstuffs."<sup>65</sup>

March 12

Strikers begin returning to work.

March 13

Work resumes throughout the island.

## 1944

### EL SALVADOR

April 2           The air force and a large part of the army rise against President Maximiliano Hernández Martínez.

April 4           Loyal troops defeat insurgents.

April 10          Ten officers are executed for participating in the revolt.

April 11          Nine officers and six civilians are condemned to death for involvement in insurrectionary conspiracy (most *in absentia*).  
One civilian is executed.

April 17          Students began to lay groundwork for a university strike.

April 23          Police stop women's march on behalf of political prisoners.

April 24          Fifteen officers and four civilians implicated in April 2 revolt are sentenced to death (most *in absentia*).  
Three officers are executed.  
University student body declares strike in protest against executions.

April 24(?)       Students and non-students begin organizing civic strike to compel Martínez to resign.

April 26          Students employed in public agencies leave their posts.

April 28          Secondary school students and teachers in San Salvador begin to absent themselves from school.

May 4            San Salvador market vendors and employees of Cooperative Interamerican Public Health Service announce intention to strike beginning May 5.

May 5            In San Salvador, physicians, lawyers, justices of the peace, pharmacists, and dentists go on strike.  
All banks and most stores in San Salvador close.  
Office employees of one railroad company, many government agencies, and the electric company walk out.

Officials of Sanitation department declare it on strike.  
In Santa Ana, students and physicians go on strike.  
In San Miguel, students strike.  
Cabinet and president of National Legislative Assembly  
meet with Martínez and reportedly advise him to re-  
sign.  
Representatives of striking groups name a committee to  
speak for them.

May 6            One railroad suspends operations.  
                  San Salvador municipal employees and more national  
                  government employees stop working.  
                  Strike spreads to Ahuachapán and Sonsonate.

May 7            San Salvador police fire at a group of boys in the street,  
                  killing one. Angry crowds pour into the streets.  
                  Cabinet decides to resign.  
                  In Santa Ana, municipal employees announce their in-  
                  tention to strike.

May 8            A huge crowd gathers before the National Palace.  
                  Remaining government employees walk out.  
                  Busses disappear from the streets in San Salvador.  
                  Service on the second railroad ends.  
                  Most businesses in Santa Ana close.  
                  Banks close in San Miguel.  
                  Schoolteachers in San Vicente declared themselves on  
                  strike.  
                  After all-day negotiations, Martínez resigns.

May 9-10        Strike continues.

May 11        Martinez leaves the country.  
                  Strike ends.

## GUATEMALA

June 22        University Students' Association presents President  
                  Jorge Ubico with a list of demands, threatening to strike  
                  if these demands are not met within twenty-four hours.  
                  President Ubico issues decree suspending several con-  
                  stitutional guarantees.  
                  Organizers of incipient Social Democratic Party decide

to organize a civic strike and draft a petition for the restoration of constitutional guarantees.

June 23 Students, teachers, and lawyers declare themselves on strike.

June 24 The petition, bearing 311 signatures, is presented to Ubico.  
Public demonstrations begin in defiance of suspension of guarantees. Crowd calls for Ubico's resignation.

June 25 Negotiations between Ubico and opposition representatives begin.  
Police fire on a procession of women, killing one.  
Martial law is declared.

June 26 Banks, stores, offices, factories, and the central market close in Guatemala City.  
Local transportation in Guatemala City stops.  
Railroad workers strike.  
Petitions for Ubico's resignation are circulated among many groups of professionals, workers, women, etc.  
Government decrees penalties for closing businesses and militarizes transport services.

June 27 Shutdown continues.

June 29 Ubico initiates new negotiations with the opposition.  
Secretary of the Treasury resigns.  
Many people return to work, as word of the president's imminent resignation spreads.

July 1 Ubico turns government over to a three-man military junta.

## HONDURAS

June 30 Three hundred citizens of San Pedro Sula sign an "open letter" calling for the resignation of President Tiburcio Carías Andino.

July 3 In Tegucigalpa, students of schools of medicine and engineering go on strike.

Opponents of Carías unsuccessfully attempt to have stores close.

July 4      Demonstrations in Tegucigalpa call for the resignation of Carías.  
About 200 Tegucigalpa lawyers, physicians, dentists, and engineers sign a petition urging the president to resign.  
Merchants are asked in person and in handbills to keep stores closed after July 4 holiday.  
In San Pedro Sula, opponents of Carías ask for and receive permission to demonstrate in honor of the United States.

July 5      Government officials tell Tegucigalpa shopkeepers "that the government expect[s] them to open as usual."<sup>86</sup>  
Business in Tegucigalpa is normal.

July 6      Proprietors of stores, factories, and banks in San Pedro Sula fail to comply with opposition appeals for a shutdown.  
Troops fire on some six to eight hundred demonstrators in San Pedro Sula, killing at least 22 people.

## NICARAGUA

June 27      University students in Managua lead demonstration of several hundred people against President Anastasio Somoza García.  
Some 400 demonstrators are detained; most released the same day.

June 28      Several thousand people participate in a pro-government demonstration.  
An estimated three thousand women march in opposition to the government.

June 29      Leaflet appears urging workers not to follow the lead of upper-class opponents of the government.

July 1      National Guard begins patrolling the streets of Managua.  
Newspapers publish notice that permits are required for demonstrations.

July 2            Government frustrates demonstration planned by opposition Conservative party by closing the cathedral and a social club and keeping traffic out of the Central Plaza.

July 3            The university is closed by government order.  
Round robin letters urge lawyers, physicians, and dentists in Managua not to reopen their offices after July 4 holiday.  
Mimeographed leaflets attacking the president appear in Managua.

July 4            Cavalry troops charge anti-government demonstrators at official July 4 celebration.  
Six hundred people seek asylum in Mexican Embassy.

July 5            A few professional offices in Managua and more in León are closed.  
President Somoza issues manifesto stating his intention to veto proposed constitutional amendment which would have allowed him to run for reelection in 1946 and promises both restoration of civil liberties and social reforms.

July 6            Leading dissidents issue statement of support for the president.  
The president of the Price and Commerce Control Board circulates an order threatening severe penalties for closing businesses.  
Offices of Managua physicians, dentists, and lawyers remain closed.  
Shops open, though employees are absent.  
One newspaper fails to appear because of a strike by employees.  
Hospital interns and some secondary and normal school students go on strike.

July 7            Some professional offices reopen.  
More dissidents are arrested.

July 10 (Mon.)    Normal activity resumes in Managua.

**1946****HAITI**

January 1 Student political newspaper, *La Ruche*, publishes an attack on dictatorship.

January 3 Authorities briefly detain the paper's editors and order them to suspend publication.

January 7 Port-au-Prince university and high school students strike and demonstrate against President Elie Lescot. Government issues an order forbidding demonstrations.

January 8-10 Civil servants, laborers, and transportation workers walk out, and shops close in Port-au-Prince. Strike spreads to other cities.

January 10 Several demonstrators are killed. Government declares martial law. President's cabinet resigns.

January 11 In negotiations with government, representatives of strike committee demand Lescot's resignation. A three-man military junta removes Lescot and takes over the government.

**1951****PANAMA**

May 7 President Arnulfo Arias dissolves the National Assembly and replaces the constitution with an earlier one giving the president a longer term in office.

May 8 Demonstrators demand the removal of the president. Widespread fighting between supporters and opponents of Arias begins.

May 9 In Panama City and Colón businesses close and transportation service is suspended. Students, teachers, nurses, physicians, and other professionals go on strike. National Assembly reconvenes, impeaches Arias, and confers presidency on the first vice president.

May 10            Supreme Court upholds action of the Assembly.  
                    National Police forcibly evict Arias from the Presidential Palace.

## 1956

### HAITI

May 17            Students at two high schools in Port-au-Prince walk out in a demonstration against President Paul Magloire. Students occupying one school are attacked and dispersed by police. Students in Jacmel and Les Cayes also go on strike. Leaflets signed by "Comité Révolutionnaire" urge citizens to support student strike. Government arrests supporters of opposition politicians.

May ?            Chauffeur guides go on strike.

May 19            Government declares state of seige in Port-au-Prince, Jacmel, and Les Cayes.

December 4        Government forbids political meetings and radio speeches. Several leading opponents of the president are arrested.

December 6-7      Magloire gives up presidency as demanded by his opponents, but immediately accepts appointment by the army as "Chief of the Executive Power." National Assembly and Council of Government are dissolved.

December 7        Lawyers announce decision to suspend their appearances in court.

December 10       Port-au-Prince businesses and most market stalls fail to open. Two of three Port-au-Prince banks close for lack of employees. Bus and taxi drivers and oil company employees strike. University students stay away from classes. Attendance at elementary and secondary schools drops significantly.

Government employees and dock workers begin leaving work.  
Hundreds of people are arrested.

December 11      Remaining businesses close.  
More government employees strike.  
Magloire calls together business owners and pressures them to reopen their establishments. A number of owners issue a statement that they plan to reopen on December 12 and ask employees to return to work.

December 12      Magloire announces his resignation.

December 13      The strike continues.

December 14      Magloire leaves the country.

## 1957

### HAITI

February 1      Opponents of President Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis demonstrate against him.  
President's cabinet resigns, citing his unwillingness to prosecute members of Magloire regime for corruption.

February 2      Fifty dissidents are arrested.  
Opposition leaders agree to call a civic strike on February 4 demanding liquidation of Magloire administration, punishment of its officials, and immediate elections.

Night of  
February 3      Pierre-Louis resigns.  
Army leaders call presidential candidates together in unsuccessful effort to get agreement on a new interim president.

February 4      Shops in Port-au-Prince are closed.  
Transportation is suspended.  
Government employees strike.  
"Plane and telephone communications [are] crippled."<sup>67</sup>  
The school of agriculture and the general hospital close.  
Six of the seven presidential candidates call for an end to the strike. The seventh urges his supporters to re-

main on strike until his candidate is named interim president.

February 5      Strike continues.  
Last presidential candidate calls for an end to the strike.

## HAITI

March 26      Several presidential candidates demand the resignation of interim President Franck Sylvain's cabinet.

March 27      Headquarters of another candidate announces imminent call for a strike to force the president to appoint an impartial cabinet.

March 28      Department of Education closes secondary schools, citing stone-throwing demonstration in one school.

March 29      President dissolves the Legislative Chambers.

March 30      Arrest of a leading presidential candidate is ordered.

April 1      Businesses in Port-au-Prince are closed.

April 2      Many stores remain closed.  
Dock workers strike.  
Army chief of staff announces Sylvain's "resignation" and arrest for complicity in a bomb plot.

## COLOMBIA

April 30      In the midst of events honoring opposition presidential candidate Guillermo León Valencia, governor of the Department of Valle orders social clubs to get prior approval for all gatherings.

May 1      Cali social clubs agree to suspend activities in protest.  
Soldiers surround the house where Valencia is staying in Cali.

May 2      University students in Popayán, Cali, Medellín, and Bogotá declare strikes.

Student demonstrations begin in Cali and Popayán.  
Bogotá university professors announce intention not to teach while Valencia remains a prisoner.  
Social clubs in Bogotá, Medellín, Popayán, Manizales, and Barranquilla close in solidarity with those of Cali.

**May 3**

A pro-government demonstration in Cali is announced.  
Press is forbidden to publish a letter from the bishop of Cali asking that the demonstration be cancelled in view of tense atmosphere.  
Women in Cali lead a large protest march against the pro-government demonstration and censorship of the bishop's letter. Marchers are attacked with tear gas.  
Students in Manizales declare a strike.  
Student demonstrations begin in Bogotá.  
Student leaders in Bogotá declare that the strike will continue until the government falls and begin to organize a civic strike.  
Valencia is permitted to travel to Bogotá and begins consulting with other opposition leaders.

**May 4**

Physicians in Cali stop working.  
Students in Cali call for a "dead city" to isolate the pro-government demonstration.  
Cali's secretary of the treasury resigns in protest against mayor's threat to fire government employees who do not participate in the demonstration.  
Pro-government demonstration takes place without incident.  
Representatives of various groups in Cali set up committees to organize a general shutdown beginning Monday, May 6.  
Troops occupy streets of Bogotá and break up gatherings of people.  
Stores on Bogotá's main street close.  
Government threatens to close the universities and draft students.

**May 5**

Rectors of six private universities in Bogotá announce decision to close them for duration of national crisis.  
Three opposition newspapers in Bogotá fail to appear.  
Leaders of Liberal and Conservative parties call for continuation of university strike—without demonstrations—until May 8 in protest against planned re-election of Rojas Pinilla by the National Constituent Assembly.

Two students are killed by police in Bogotá.  
Bogotá students distribute leaflets calling upon public to join in a general shutdown.  
In Popayán, student demonstrations call for suspension of all activity by the public.  
In Cali, union presidents meet and agree to join the strike movement.  
All independent newspapers in the country agree to suspend publication.

**May 6**  
Banks close in Bogotá.  
Medical Association of Antioquia and the executive committee of the Union of Colombian Workers (UTC) issue statements of support for the movement.

**May 7**  
Businesses close in Cali.  
Factories and banks close in Medellín.  
In Bogotá, commerce is shut down, and factories begin to close.  
Citizen groups send messages to the president demanding free elections.  
In Cali, thugs hired by the government kill several people. Many opposition activists are imprisoned.

**May 8**  
Opposition leaders claim strike is spreading to Barranquilla.  
Medellín professionals issue manifesto demanding free elections.  
In a meeting with Bogotá bankers, Rojas Pinilla proposes that he resign in favor of a hand-picked designate. Bankers reject proposal.  
Bishop of Cali excommunicates persons responsible for killing (except in self-defense) and for mistreatment of prisoners, May 6–8.  
The superintendent of banks takes control of the Bank of Bogotá.  
President decrees that banks may not collect interest for the period they are closed.  
National Constituent Assembly elects Rojas Pinilla to a new four-year term.  
In acceptance speech, Rojas Pinilla denounces oligarchy and announces that bank employees have been drafted.  
Heads of transportation companies meet to consider possibility of ending bus service.  
Some transportation companies suspend service.

Massive demonstrations continue into the night in Cali.  
More people are killed.  
Armed forces commanders demand the president's resignation.  
Rojas Pinilla, opposition leadership, and armed forces leaders engage in extended discussion of his resignation and replacement.

May 10                    Rojas Pinilla resigns in favor of a three-man military junta and leaves the country.

## 1961

### DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

November 28                    Negotiations between President Joaquín Balaguer and opposition Unión Cívica Nacional (UCN) over restructuring of government break down.  
UCN calls civic strike to demand Balaguer's resignation.  
Associations of students and lawyers, as well as trade unions, announce their support.  
Business, industry, and urban transportation are paralyzed.  
Government workers strike.  
The armed forces take over operation of international airport and docks.  
A curfew is imposed.  
Opposition radio stations are ordered off the air.

November 29                    Government reduces prices on several products and replaces chief of police.  
Thirteen air force pilots call for replacement of chief of the armed forces, offering to resign if he stays.  
Secretary of State for Agriculture resigns.

December 3                    Five air force officers resign.  
UCN-government negotiations resume amid increasing concern about the UCN's ability to sustain the strike.

December 7                    Balaguer and UCN reach an agreement on creation of a council of state, from which he would resign within six weeks.  
Cabinet rejects the agreement because of opposition

from armed forces and ruling Dominican Party.

December 9      UCN calls off the strike on the basis of December 7 agreement.

December 10      Balaguer announces intention to remain in office until August 1962.

December 11      The United States publicly expresses concern about attitude of the military.

December 16      President of the United States sends personal letter to Balaguer and chief of the armed forces, pressuring them to agree with opposition on a new interim government.

December 17      Balaguer agrees to leave office by February 27, 1962 and armed forces chief accepts the plan.

## NOTES

1. The term "*paro cívico*" is used in Colombia with this meaning. In recent years it has come to refer to the shutdown of a city to pressure the government for better public services, but one writer on the subject notes that it "appears on the scene as a result of the so-called 'days of May,' promoted by the bloc of forces united against the dictatorship of General Rojas Pinilla in 1957. The general stoppage promoted by bourgeois sectors . . . was invested with the form '*paro cívico*' to connote the civil resistance of 'the entire people' . . ." Pedro Santana R., *Desarrollo regional y paros cívicos en Colombia* (Bogotá: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular, 1983), p. 12. Cf. Jaime Carrillo Bedoya, *Los paros cívicos en Colombia*, (Bogotá: Editorial La Oveja Negra, 1981), p. 13: ". . . the social base of *paros cívicos* is generally multiclass. In these movements industrialists and large landowners as well as the . . . 'marginal population,' and the shopkeepers, employees, students, workers, and peasants in between participate all at once."

2. Published accounts of the shutdown that figured in the removal of President Marcos Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela suggest the possibility that the strike triggered the military uprising that followed a few days later, just as a number of the civic strikes considered in this paper induced the military to act. However, a detailed study of this insurrection has established beyond doubt that the civilians did not act independently; the civic strike and the military revolt were planned in advance as mutually reinforcing actions. Joseph J. Doyle, "Venezuela 1958: Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy" (Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 1967).

3. These events have been reconstructed on the basis of the following sources:

Chile, 1931: Raúl Marín Balmaceda, *La caída de un régimen: Julio de 1931* (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1933); Frederick Nunn, *Chilean Politics, 1920-1931: The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970), pp. 161-65; H. Ochoa Mena, *La revolución de julio: La caída de la tiranía militar en Chile* (Santiago: Imprenta "Cisneros," 1931); Terence Stephen Tarr, "Military Intervention and Civilian Reaction in Chile, 1924-1936" (Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1960), pp. 103-12.

Cuba, 1933: *New York Times*, August 2-13, 1933; Lionel Soto, *La revolución del 33*, vol. 2 (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1977), pp. 235-41; 315-61; Boris Goldenberg, "Surgimiento y declinar de un partido: el PC cubano (1925-1959)," *Revista Conservadora del Pensamiento Centroamericano* (Managua) 25 (January 1971), 56.

Ecuador, 1933: William Dawson (United States ambassador to Ecuador) to Secretary of State, despatches 1101, August 21; 1104, August 22; 1113, August 29; 1119, September 1; 1124, September 3; and telegram 34, August 31, 1933; Decimal File 822.00/924, 926, 934, 937, 939, 927. General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, United States National Archives, National Archives Building, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter abbreviated as RG 59, NA). *El Comercio* (Quito), August 20-22, 29-31, September 1, 2, 1933.

Cuba, 1935: *New York Times*, February 13, 19, 21-28, March 1-3, 5-14, 1935; José Duarte Oropesa, *Historiología cubana*, vol. 2 (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1974), pp. 491-96; Ladislao González Carbajal, *El Ala Izquierda Estudiantil y su época* (Havana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Cubano del Libro, 1974), pp. 423-68; Ruby Hart Phillips, *Cuba, Land of Paradox* (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959), pp. 164-68; Hortensia Pichardo, *Documentos para la historia de Cuba*, vol. 4, (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Cubano del Libro, 1980), pp. 551-64, 578-79.

El Salvador, 1944: Patricia Parkman, *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador: The Fall of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez* (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1988), pp. 58-87.

Guatemala, 1944: Christina Anne Clamp, "The Overthrow of Jorge Ubico: A Case of Nonviolent Action in Guatemala" (B.A. thesis, Friends World College, 1976), pp. 62-99; [Baltasar Morales], *La caída de Jorge Ubico: Derrocamiento de una tiranía*, 3rd ed. (Guatemala City: Tip. Nacional, 1966); Arcadio Ruiz Franco, *Fermentos de lucha: Hambre y miseria* (Guatemala City: n.p., 1950), pp. 35-50; Kenneth J. Grieb, *Guatemalan Caudillo: The Regime of Jorge Ubico, Guatemala 1931-1944* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979), pp. 272-75, and "The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of 1944," *The Americas* 32:4 (April 1976): 530; *New York Times*, June 27, July 1, 1944.

Honduras, 1944: John D. Erwin (United States ambassador to Honduras), telegrams 207, July 3; 208, July 4; 209, July 5; 210, July 6; despatch 1183, July 7, 1944; Francis C. Jordan (American vice consul, Puerto Cortes) to Erwin, July 15, 1944; Lee M. Hunsaker (American vice consul, Puerto Cortes), Voluntary Report #43, July 15, 1944; W.F. Paredes et al. [approximately 300 signatories], "Carta abierta dirigida al sr. presidente de la república, grnl. Tiburcio Cariás Andino" (San Pedro Sula, June 30, 1944), enclosed with Hunsaker, Voluntary Report #47, July 20, 1944; Concha R. de López, Mercedes A. de Collier, María A. de Gonzalez, Irma C. de Ocano, Leonor de Gómez Robelo, Eva de Peraza, E. de Guerrero, and Blanca Bonilla Reina to Hunsaker, July 20, 1944, enclosed with Hunsaker, Voluntary Report #50, July 29, 1944; Decimal File 815.00/7-344, 7-444, 7-544, 7-644, 7-744, 7-1544, 7-2044, 7-2944. RG 59, NA.

Nicaragua, 1944: James B. Stewart (United States ambassador to Nicaragua) to Secretary of State, despatch 2364 and telegram 409, July 3; telegram 417, July 4; despatches 2365, 2366, and 2368, July 5; telegram 425, July 6; despatch 2409, July 18; telegrams 431, July 7; 437, July 10, 1944; Decimal

File 817.00/7-344, 7-444, 7-544, 7-644, 7-1844; 7-744; 7-1044. RG 59, NA; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1967), vol 7, pp. 1396, 1400-1401.

Haiti, 1946: *New York Times*, January 12, 1946; Raymond Pace Alexander, "Haiti's Bid for Freedom," *The Nation* 162:18 (May 4, 1946): 534-35; Dantès Bellegarde, *Histoire du peuple haïtien (1492-1952)* (Port-au-Prince: [n.p., Collection du tricinquanteenaire de l'indépendance d'Haïti], 1953), pp. 317-18; Colbert Bonhomme, *Les origines e les leçons d'une révolution profonde et pacifique* (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de l'Etat, 1946), pp. 29-38, 50; Robert Debs Heinl and Nancy Gordon Heinl, *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1971* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1978), pp. 544-45; Henri Malfan: *Cinq décennies d'histoire du mouvement étudiant haïtien* (Montreal: Edition Jeune Clarté, 1981), pp. 36-38.

Panama, 1951: *New York Times*, May 8-10; *Hispanic-American Report* 4:6 (June 1951), 15-16; Larry LaRae Pippin, *The Rémon Era: An Analysis of a Decade of Events in Panama, 1947-57* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 69-76.

Haiti, May 1956: Malfan, *Mouvement étudiant haïtien*, pp. 43-46; Colbert Bonhomme, *Révolution et contre-révolution en Haïti de 1946 à 1957* (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de l'état, 1957), pp. 97-103; Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood*, p. 571.

Haiti, December 1956: *New York Times*, December 8-9, 11-15, 1956; articles in *Le Jour* (Port-au-Prince), December 7, 12, 1956 and *Le Nouvelliste* (Port-au-Prince), December 11, 1956, reproduced in Clément Celestin, *Compilations pour l'histoire*, vol. 1 (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie N. A. Théodore, 1958), pp. 38-39, 40-41, 45-46; Bonhomme, *Révolution et contre-révolution*, pp. 106-25; Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood*, p. 574.

Haiti, February 1957: *New York Times*, February 3, 5, 6, 7, 1957; articles in *Le Nouvelliste*, February 2, 4-6, 1957, *Haïti-Miroir* (Port-au-Prince), February 5, 1957, and *Le Matin* (Port-au-Prince), February 5, 1957, reproduced in Celestin, *Compilations*, vol. 1, pp. 97-98, 112-120; Bonhomme, *Révolution et contre-révolution*, pp. 135-39; Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood*, p. 577.

Haiti, March-April, 1957: *New York Times*, April 2, 3, 1957; articles in *Le Nouvelliste*, March 29, 30, 1957, *Le Jour*, March 29, April 2-3, 1957, reproduced in Celestin, *Compilations*, vol. 1, pp. 209-10, 214-15, 224-26, 238.

Colombia, 1957: Abelardo Londoño Marín and Flavio Correa Restrepo, "Soldados sin coraza" (*Historia de una revolución*), (Medellín: Editorial Bedout, 1957); José Berardo García, *La explosión de mayo* (Cali: Imprenta Departamental, 1957); Luis E. Agudelo Ramírez and Rafael Montoya y Montoya, *Los guerrilleros intelectuales: cartas, documentos e informaciones que prohibió la censura*, 2nd ed. (Medellín: Publicaciones Agumont, 1957), pp. 277-98; *Las jornadas de mayo: Texto completo de todos los documentos que condujeron al movimiento liberador de Colombia el 10 de Mayo de 1957* (Bogotá: Ediciones Documentos Colombianos, [n.d.]), pp. 101-200; Jonathan Hartlyn, "Military Governments and the Transition to Civilian Rule: The Colombian Experi-

ence of 1957-1958," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 26:2 (May 1984): 256; John Martz, *Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962), pp. 236-241; Tad Szulc, *Twilight of the Tyrants* (New York: Holt, 1959), pp. 204-248.

Dominican Republic, 1961: *New York Times*, November 28-December 4, December 7-8, 10-12, 18, 20, 1961; *Hispanic-American Report* 14:12 (January 1962): 993-94; 15:1 (February 1962): 1094-96; Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 772; Eduardo Latorre, *Política dominicana contemporánea* (Santo Domingo: Editora Cosmos, 1975), p. 119.

4. Richard M. Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America" (1964), reprinted in Howard J. Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition* (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1974), p. 65.

5. Obviously this generalization does not apply to Haiti, where the traditional contenders for power were an urban mulatto elite, which derived its wealth from commerce rather than from land, and black leaders of the army, but Haiti underwent changes similar to those that occurred in the other countries, stimulated in part by the United States occupation of 1915-1935.

6. John J. Johnson, *Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 1-2.

7. Kalman H. Silvert, *The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America*, rev. ed. (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1966), p. 21.

8. Dawson to Secretary of State, despatch 1073, July 22, 1933, Decimal file 822.00/912, RG 59, N.A.; Ronald M. Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954* (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 10; *New York Times*, June 27, 1944; William S. Stokes, "Honduras," *The Americana Annual: An Encyclopedia of Current Events* (New York: Chicago American Corp., 1945), pp. 56-57; "Another Revolution," *Inter-American*, 5 (February 1946): 7; "Exit Lescot," *Time* 47 (January 21, 1946): 36.

9. Dawson, despatch 1104, August 22, 1933, Decimal File 822.00/926, RG 59, NA; Parkman, *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador*, pp. 1-2.

10. Stokes denies the existence of repression in Honduras. *Honduras: An Area Study in Government* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1950), pp. 260-61. But cf. John Martz, *Central America: The Crisis and the Challenge* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), pp. 120, 123; John B. Faust, United States Chargé d'affaires ad interim, Honduras, to Secretary of State, despatch 1045, May 12, 1944, Decimal File 815.00/4969; RG 59, NA. William Krehm paints a still darker picture, no doubt based on opposition sources. *Democracies and Tyrannies of the Caribbean* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1984), pp. 89-91. On the dictatorial trend of the Arias government, see Pippin, *Remón Era*, pp. 66-69.

11. Pippin, *Remón Era*, p. 72.

12. Bonhomme, *Révolution et contre-révolution*, p. 95.

13. On reasons for hostility to Pierre-Louis, see *New York Times*, February 5, 6, 1957; Bonhomme, *Révolution et contre-révolution*, pp. 135-39; Patrick Bellegard Smith, "Class Struggle in Contemporary Haitian Politics: An Interpretive Study of the Campaign of 1957," *Journal of Caribbean Studies* 2:1 (Spring 1981): 120.

Sylvain came under attack for favoritism in the competition among candidates for the presidency. *Le Nouvelliste* and *Le Jour*, March 29, 1957, as reproduced in Celestin, *Compilations*, vol. 1, pp. 209-10, 225-26; Bellegarde-Smith, "Class Struggle," 120.

Mera of Ecuador presided over a quite unremarkable constitutional government. A representative of the Liberal oligarchy of Guayaquil, he was unpopular for a number of reasons, particularly in Quito, the stronghold of the Conservative party. The primary reason for his vulnerability, however, was probably the extreme fragility of all Ecuadoran governments. His was one of twenty-five that ruled between 1925 and 1940, none of which lasted out a four-year term. Dawson, despatches 1073, July 22; 1083, July 31; 1101, August 21, 1933; Decimal file 822.00/912, 913, and 924, RG 59, NA; Alfredo Pareja y Diez Canseco, *Historia del Ecuador*, 2nd ed. (Quito: Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 1958), pp. 408-11; José A. Llerena, *Frustración política en veintidos años* (Quito: Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 1950), pp. 45-46, 7.

14. Frederick B. Pike, *Chile and the United States, 1880-1962* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), pp. 199-200.

15. This was true even of Lescot, who represented the mulatto elite of Haiti, and of Ubico, whose policies generally favored the large landowners of Guatemala. See "Exit Lescot"; Antonin Dumas-Pierre, "La garde d'Haïti et la conjoncture de 1946" (M.A. thesis: Université du Québec à Montréal), pp. 70, 77; Clamp, "The Overthrow of Jorge Ubico," p. 59; Richard Newbold Adams, *Crucifixion by Power: Essays on Guatemalan National Social Structure, 1944-1966* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), p. 183.

Some accounts assert that upper class Cubans supported Batista. González Carabal, *Ala Izquierda*, pp. 459-60; Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 699. There is evidence, however, that some had turned against the government by March 1935. *New York Times*, March 1, 10, 11, 14. See also, González Carabal, *Ala Izquierda*, p. 424, and Duarte Oropesa, *Historología cubana*, vol. 2, p. 491.

On upper class opposition to Machado, Martínez, and Somoza, see Luis A. Pérez, *Army Politics in Cuba, 1898-1958* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), p. 58; José A. Tabares del Real, *Guiteras* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Cubano del Libro, 1973), p. 112; Parkman, *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador*, pp. 35-37, 41-43, 56-57; Jeffrey L. Gould, "For an Organized Nicaragua": Somoza and the Labour Movement, 1944-1948," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 19:2 (November 1987): 358, 361-62.

16. Szulc, *Twilight of the Tyrants*, p. 7.

17. Latorre, *Política dominicana*, pp. 160-61; Juan Bosch also emphasized this point in *The Unfinished Experiment: Democracy in the Dominican Republic*

(New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 27-28.

18. Leslie François Manigat, *Haiti of the Sixties, Object of International Concern* (Washington: Center of Foreign Policy Research [1964]), pp. 42-43; Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood*, pp. 574, 577; Bellegarde-Smith, "Class Struggle," pp. 115-16, 118, 120; *Le Nouvelliste*, February 4, 1957 and *Le Jour*, March 29, 1957, as reproduced in Celestin, *Compilations*, vol. 1, pp. 113, 225-26.
19. Nunn, *Chilean Politics*, pp. 138-42.
20. Ochoa Mena, *Revolución de julio*, pp. 136-7; Nunn, *Chilean Politics*, p. 163. The quotation is from Nunn.
21. Parkman, *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador*, pp. 39-43, 49-50, 52, 55-60; Morales, *La caída de Jorge Ubico*, pp. 33, 21-30.
22. *Hispanic-American Report* 15:1 (February 1962), 1096.
23. David Nicholls, "Ideology and Political Protest in Haiti, 1930-46," *Journal of Contemporary History* 9:4 (October, 1974): 13, 24-25; Dumas-Pierre, *Garde d'Haiti*, pp. 62, 69.
24. Manigat, *Haiti of the Sixties*, pp. 44, 46-47; Bonhomme, *Révolution et contre-révolution*, pp. 84, 106.
25. Bonhomme, *Révolution et contre-révolution*, p. 135; Robert I. Rotberg with Christopher K. Clague, *Haiti: The Politics of Squalor* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), p. 188, 190; *Le Nouvelliste*, March 29, 1957, as reproduced in Celestin, *Compilations*, vol. 1, pp. 209-10.
26. Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood*, p. 544.
27. Frank Bonilla, "Students in Politics: Three Generations of Political Action in a Latin-American University" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1959), pp. 104-6; Marín Balmaceda, *Caida de un régimen*, pp. 30-31, 53-54; Parkman, *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador*, pp. 40-41, 49; Londoño Marín and Correa Restrepo, "Soldados sin coraza", pp. 33, 80-83; Grieb, *Guatemalan Caudillo*, p. 272; Clamp, "The Overthrow of Jorge Ubico," pp. 67-71.
28. Bosch, *Unfinished Experiment*, pp. 23, 33; Bonhomme, *Révolution et contre-révolution*, pp. 106, 84; John Biesanz and Luke M. Smith, "Panamanian Politics," *Journal of Politics* 14 (August 1952): 401.
29. On the role of Colombian unions, see Robert Alexander, *Organized Labor in Latin America* (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 139-40; *Jornadas de mayo*, p. 148. The labor federation that appeared in the Dominican Republic after the death of Trujillo "for some time was closely associated with the Unión Cívica Nacional." Robert Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-177. Cf. de Onis, "Violence": "The National Civic Union does not have effective control of labor. There is no fully organized labor movement here." On the relationship of Haiti's few labor organizations to political leaders, see Rotberg, *Politics of Squalor*, p. 177; Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood*, p. 574; *Le Jour*, March 29, 1957, as reproduced in Celestin, *Compilations*, vol. 1, p. 224.
30. John and Mavis Biesanz, *The People of Panama* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955) p. 212.

31. Nunn, *Chilean Politics*, p. 163.
32. Parkman, *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador*, pp. 39, 41-42, 44-45,
- 55.
33. Biesanz and Biesanz, *loc. cit.*
34. Parkman, *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador*, pp. 65, 71-72, 74; Morales, *La caída de Jorge Ubico*, p. 81.
35. On the first women's march in Honduras, see W. L. McGinness, Jr. (United States Embassy staff, Tegucigalpa), to Erwin, May 31, 1944, enclosed with Erwin despatch 1094, May 31, 1944, decimal file 815.00/4704, RG 59.
36. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1944, vol. 7, pp. 1396, 1400-1401; Erwin, telegram 208, July 4, 1944 and despatch 1183, July 7, 1944; Decimal file 815.00/7-444 and 7-744; RG 59, NA.
37. Parkman, *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador*, p. 72; Hartlyn, "Military Governments," 255; Londoño Marín and Correa Restrepo, "*Soldados sin coraza*", pp. 65, 74-75, 243; *Hispanic-American Report* (February 1962), 1096; *New York Times*, December 3, 1961; de Onis, "Violence."
38. One account asserts that "transportation was almost totally paralyzed" in Santiago. Tarr, "Military Intervention and Civilian Reaction," pp. 111-12. However, according to a contemporary news report, streetcar service was suspended because rioters had attacked streetcars. *New York Times*, July 25, 1933. No source consulted mentions a strike by streetcar conductors or drivers of other vehicles.
39. Duarte claimed that CNOC (then controlled by the Cuban Communist Party) did *not* issue a definitive order for a general strike. Thomson implies that one was called for March 11, and this version is supported by brief references to Communist foot-dragging in Alba and Robert Alexander. Duarte, *Historiología cubana* vol. 2, p. 494; Charles A. Thomson, "The Cuban Revolution: Reform and Reaction," *Foreign Policy Reports* 11 (January, 1936): 274; Victor Alba, *Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 292; Alexander, *Organized Labor*, p. 157. Contemporary *New York Times* reports are somewhat confusing on this point. See March 8, 9, 10, 1935. On the attitude of the Communist Party toward the strike, see also Tabares del Real, *Guiteras*, p. 474; Goldenberg, "PC cubano," 60; González, *Ala Izquierda*, pp. 461, 464.
40. Dawson, despatches, 1104, August 22; 1119, September 1; 1123, September 3, 1933; Decimal file 1822.00/926, 937, and 938; RG 59, NA.
41. Clarence H. Haring, "The Chilean Revolution of 1931," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 13:2 (May 1933): 202; Gould, "Somoza and the Labour Movement," 358-61.
42. Bosch, *Unfinished Experiment*, p. 41.
43. Ochoa Mena, *Revolución de julio*, p. 94; "Another Revolution," 7.
44. Parkman, *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador*, pp. 49-50; Morales, *Caída de Jorge Ubico*, pp. 66-67; Clamp, "Overthrow of Jorge Ubico," p. 83; de López, et al, July 20, 1944, Decimal File 815.00/7-2044; Stewart, despatches 2364, July 3, and 2368, July 5, 1944, Decimal File 817.00/7-344 and 7-544, RG

59, NA; Malfan, *Mouvement étudiant haïtien*, p. 37; Colbert, *Origines*, p. 33.

45. Pérez, *Army Politics in Cuba*, p. 63.

46. Phillips, *Cuba: Land of Paradox*, p. 18; Soto, *Revolución del 33*, vol. 2, pp. 197-98; Tabares del Real, *Guiteras*, pp. 181-220; Duarte Oropesa, *Historiología cubana*, vol. 2, p. 414; Alberto Lamar Schweyer, *Cómo cayó el presidente Machado*, 2nd ed. (Havana: La Casa Montalvo Cárdenas, 1938), pp. 130, 132-33; *New York Times*, August 4, 6, 9, 1933.

47. Lamar Schweyer, *Cómo cayó el presidente Machado*, pp. 132-33; Soto, *Revolución del 33*, p. 343.

48. González, *Ala Izquierda*, pp. 460-61, 63; "Del diario de Pablo de la Torriente Brau" and Antonio Guiteras to Pedro P. Torrado et al., Pichardo, *Documentos*, vol. 4, pp. 577, 580, 582-83; *New York Times*, February 21, March 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 1935.

49. Guiteras to Torrado, Pichardo, *Documentos*, vol. 4, p. 583; Tabares del Real, *Guiteras*, p. 474; González, *Ala Izquierda*, p. 462; Thomson, "Reform and Reaction," 273. The quotation is from Thomson.

50. *Revolución de julio*, p. 107.

51. Tarr, "Military Intervention," p. 111; Marín Balmaceda, *Caída de un régimen*, p. 57; Ochoa Mena, *Revolución de julio*, pp. 109, 153-55.

52. In the case of Chile, this point is in doubt. Clarence Haring, who did not indicate the source of his figures, asserted that "some twenty were killed, and perhaps two hundred wounded, the carabineros sharing casualties equally with the civilians." Haring, "Chilean Revolution," 202-3. On the other hand, Ochoa Mena's detailed account, based on his own observation and "firsthand and trustworthy sources as far as possible," indicated no more than fourteen deaths, though he estimated that more than three hundred were injured. The victims he specifically mentioned included only three policemen, two wounded in the siege of the university on July 24 and one (in civilian clothes and presumably off-duty) who died in a free-for-all the next day. *Revolución de julio*, pp. 4, 121, 109, 148-149. Raúl Marín Balmaceda, also a contemporary Chilean observer, mentioned the death of only one policeman during the insurrection, probably on July 24. *Caída de un régimen*, p. 58. Isaac Joselin Cox, who cited both Haring and Marín in his bibliography, accepted Haring's casualty figures. "Chile" in A. Curtis Wilgus, ed., *Argentina, Brazil and Chile Since Independence* (1935; reprint ed., New York: Russell & Russell, 1963), p. 406.

53. *Revolución de julio*, p. 101.

54. Bonhomme, *Révolution et contre-révolution*, p. 107.

55. Berardo García, *Explosión de mayo*, p. 100.

56. Phillips, *Cuba, Land of Paradox*, p. 56; *New York Times*, August 7, 10, 1933; November 30, December 1, and December 2, 1961; Parkman, *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador*, pp. 78-79; *New York Times*, July 3, 1944.

57. "Tyrant Down," *Time* 44 (July 10, 1944): 43; Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala*, p. 11; López et al., July 20, 1944; Lee M. Hunsaker, Voluntary Report #54, August 8, 1944, Decimal File 815.00/7-2944 and 8-844, RG 59,

NA; Cf. Berardo García, *Explosión de mayo*, p. 88: "The *frente cívico* never intended to grasp deadly arms, but rather to maintain itself in inactivity, in *brazos caídos*, in simple inaction."

58. La F.O.R.A.: *ideología y trayectoria del movimiento obrero revolucionario en la Argentina*, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Proyección, 1971), p. 102.

59. Ochoa Mena, *Revolución de julio*, pp. 155-56.

60. Nunn, *Chilean Politics*, 165. Parkman, *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador*, pp. 80, 101.

61. By the time the Panamanian National Police resorted to a gun battle to force Arias out of the presidential palace (which caused most of the deaths in the events of May 1951), the action of the congress and the supreme court had already made him an ex-president. His successor, with the support of the general population, the civilian bureaucracy, and the only armed force in the country, could conceivably have run the government from his home, leaving Arias to enjoy isolated and impotent splendor in the executive mansion. (I am indebted to George Lakey for this intriguing idea.) The significance of the National Police action thus lay not in the physical eviction of the former president but in the fact that its commander had transferred his allegiance to the new president.

62. Pérez, *Army Politics in Cuba*, pp. 70-73.

63. Ochoa Mena, *Revolución de julio*, pp. 126-34. The quotations are from pp. 127 and 132.

64. Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 10-15, 741, 747-48, 752-53.

65. Nunn, *Chilean Politics*, p. 165; Phillips, *Cuba: Land of Paradox*, p. 31; Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala*, p. 12; Londoño Marín and Correa Restrepo, "Soldados sin coraza," pp. 263, 345; Martz, *Colombia*, p. 240. Emphasis added.

66. Pike, *Chile and the United States*, p. 199.

67. Parkman, *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador*, p. 82; Bonhomme, *Origines*, p. 44; Krehm, *Democracies and Tyrannies*, p. 206; Martz, *Colombia*, p. 239.

68. Thomas, *Pursuit of Freedom*, pp. 698-99.

69. *New York Times*, March 10, 1935.

70. Sharp, *Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp. 733-34.

71. Marín Balmaceda, *Caída de un régimen*, pp. 66-67. Marín Balmaceda's revelations suggest that the rebellion in the streets played a more important role in Ibáñez's downfall than Ochoa Mena thought, not because it posed a physical threat to the regime but because the measures it called forth injured the president's self-image. On the significance of self-image in the process of accommodation, see Sharp, *Politics of Nonviolent Action*, p. 734.

72. Parkman, *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador*, pp. 81-85, 80.

73. *Politics of Squalor*, p. 177.

74. *New York Times*, December 13, 1956; *Politics of Squalor*, p. 186.

75. Martz, *Colombia*, pp. 236, 240-41; Szulc, *Twilight of the Tyrants*, p. 244; Hartlyn, "Military Governments," 255-56.
76. "Ousting Arias," *Newsweek* 37 (May 21, 1951): 46.
77. Pérez, *Army Politics in Cuba*, pp. 72-75.
78. Jerome Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Republic* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 9.
79. Jerome Slater, "The United States, the Organization of American States and the Dominican Republic, 1961-1963," *International Organization* 18:2 (Spring 1964): 278-79, 282-83.
80. *New York Times*, January 18, 1934, March 9, 1935.
81. Onis, "Violence," *New York Times*, December 3, 1961.
82. Charles W. Anderson, "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics" (1964), reprinted in Wiarda, *Politics and Social Change*, pp. 255, 254, 256-57.
83. On the events in Bolivia, see Jerry Ladman, ed., *Modern-Day Bolivia: Legacy of the Revolution and Prospects for the Future* (Tempe: Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University, 1982), p. 385; *Latin America Weekly Report*, September 10, 17, 24, 1982.
84. *New York Times*, March 7, 1935.
85. *New York Times*, March 12, 1935.
86. Erwin, despatch 1183, July 7, 1944, Decimal file 815.00/7-744, RG 59, NA.
87. *New York Times*, February 7, 1957.